

# STUDENT ESSAY

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SUPPORTING A SYNERGISTIC MAELSTROM--  
THE 9TH INFANTRY DIVISION (MOTORIZED)

BY

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USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

SUPPORTING A SYNERGISTIC MAELSTROM--  
THE 9TH INFANTRY DIVISION (MOTORIZED)

An Individual Essay

by

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ABSTRACT

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The story of the 9th Infantry Division (Motorized) logistical support concept has yet to be told. Critics do not fully understand its capabilities. The Division presents the best of both worlds--combining the austere structuring of the Light Divisions with the mobility and firepower of the Heavy Divisions. This organization is best suited for accomplishing AirLand Battle Doctrine. The essay provides a quick overview of the logistical support concepts and structure. Recommendations are made to further refine this Division as well as those structured under the Army of Excellence flag. The elimination of the brigade and division logistics sections is but one example of the forward thinking presented in this essay.



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Supporting A Synergistic Maelstrom--  
The 9th Infantry Division (Motorized)

Introduction

I spent many a dust-caked moment in the deserts of Washington, California and Texas gathering background information for this paper. At the time, never realizing an opportunity would arise to publish my observations and experiences. From April 1983 to June 1986 I served as a Support Battalion Commander and Division Support Command Executive Officer. I was able to experience firsthand the evolution from Light Infantry to a high tech Motorized Division. As an insider I was actively involved in the Division's refinement and validation.

I will present a brief historical background of the logistics organization structure, unique commodity support concepts, command and control enhancements and my recommendations and conclusions on refining logistics operations--Army wide.

The story has yet to be told, and there are many questions to be answered in regard to the Motorized Infantry Division--U.S. type. A viable concept? Can it be fielded? Is it supportable/sustainable? The answer to these questions is unequivocally, yes. Where did it all begin?

### Historical Background

In 1981 General Meyer, then Chief of Staff of the Army, created the High Technology Test Bed and initiated testing of a High Technology Light Division. His successor, General Wickham, pursued the original vision of fielding a Division with the deployability and sustainability of a Light Infantry Division--and with the firepower and survivability of a heavy Armored Division. In just four years the 9th Infantry Division developed into the objective force. This is a relatively short period of time, considering the normal life cycle of designing, organizing, approving and fielding a divisional force. Many shortcuts were taken in research, development and acquisition. Surrogates were tested based upon a battalion commander's brilliant initiatives, e.g. Fast Attack Vehicle (dune buggies). Nowhere in the Army could your ideas be conceived, developed, tested, and so rapidly--if merited--adopted into the organizational structure.

But what a logistics nightmare. How do you support such a fast moving deep strike unit? I will address this issue in a macro overview of the "How to" of logistical support--for a synergistic maneuver division, such as the 9th Infantry Division (Motorized). The Motorized Division evolved specifically from the strategic concepts of AirLand Battle, Army 21 and similar documents. It represents the Army of the planned future. How did it evolve?

The 9th Infantry Division (Motorized), hereafter referred to as "the Division," was organized as a rapid deploying, highly mobile, lethal force capable of executing its wartime mission in any part of the globe. Understandably, some areas of the world are far more desirable for deployment of this mobile force than others. Additionally, a 13,600 manpower ceiling was placed on the Division. It was designed in accordance with all of these factors. It must be deployed as part of a U.S. Corps or provided extensive Host Nation Support (HNS) until Corps support arrives. Units operating out of sector must be accompanied by a supporting slice. This support concept can be easily executed within the 9th I.D. and will be further explained later in the text. The Division approved design structure (Figure 1), which requires logistics support, is composed of three combat brigades-- with a maneuver mix of five heavy combined arms battalions, two light combined arms battalions and two light attack battalions; one combat Cavalry Brigade Air Attack, including a ground cavalry element; a Division Artillery Brigade with a light artillery and rocket battalion; a Division Support Command; and various Division troop units.

This Division is unique in that it has as much firepower in one Brigade as other Divisions in their entirety. A real support nightmare. Now to the concept. The goal--to insure



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# DIVISION STRUCTURE




FIGURE 1

the greatest amount of firepower operational at all times-- requires that maintenance be performed as far forward as possible. The technique of performing rapid battle damage assessments and mission essential maintenance only is critical to the success of the Division. Why waste your time rebuilding parts? Many items of equipment can be replaced through cross leveling or cannibalization. The Division Support Command (DISCOM) requires a supply point distribution system basically the same as any other DISCOM. The distribution points are located in the Brigade Support Area (BSA). Each has a very limited capability--within the austere DISCOM organization--to push unit supplies forward or meet at designated rendezvous points. The cache system of distribution is also a viable option for providing supplies forward to support a deep strike mission. The Division relies heavily on Corps elements to provide essential backup support. To pare the Division down to its objective manpower constraints, all fat was carved away and some of the service support muscle was atrophied without a corresponding reduction in maneuver or firepower resources. Except for artillery ammunition and potable water, the Division is capable of operating independently for up to 72 hours without backup corps or host nation support. Maneuver units have an added advantage because they do not have to go to the rear of

their trains to get direct support. The maneuver units field trains are usually collocated with the DISCOM units in the brigade support area. These trains push supplies forward to the combat trains located well forward in the battle area. The combat trains then deliver supplies forward to the logistics release points (LRP's)--behind the first terrain feature from the forward edge of the battle (FEBA). The synergistic movement and attack capabilities of this division requires an austere, but efficient logistical unit. The logistics supporting units must be highly mobile, flexible and capable of rapidly task organizing. This places the greatest force forward at the right time and place to fight and win.

#### Logistics Organizational Structure

How is the motorized division support command organized to accomplish this intricate support mission? The DISCOM headquarters is organized in much the same manner as other divisions with some important exceptions: First, an organic rear area combat operations (RACO) cell contributes to the operations section of the headquarters. Second, the headquarters is combined with the Material Management Center to form one company, which greatly reduces the administrative override required in manning two company headquarters. Third, three forward support battalions provide habitual support relationships to dedicated maneuver brigades. Fourth, an

aviation support battalion aligns with the Cavalry Brigade Air Attack. Finally, a main support battalion provides support to the Division Rear Area (DRA) and as required, backup support to the forwards.

Many critics question the merit of the support battalion. Anyone who has been supported under this concept or who has had the privilege to command this unit will agree without reservation that it is far superior to the forward area support team (FAST). No other unit past or present has been more capable of keeping pace with and distributing service support assets at the critical time and place to best influence the battle than the support battalion. A report made to the Logistics Center after evaluation of the Forward Support Battalion versus the FAST concept 18-22 September 1983 fully substantiates the capability of the support battalion. Simply stated it says

The FSB concept constitutes a significant improvement. The advantages of the FSB so outweighed the FAST approach that a grave error would be made by abolishing the FSB concept and returning to the 'former way of doing business'.... Further, there is every indication that CSS under the FSB results in higher supported unit operational readiness rates and a faster recognition and response to support requirements. This stems mainly from the dedicated nature of the FSB and its greatly improved command and control compared to that of a FASCO orchestrating the efforts of CSS units detached from DISCOM functional battalions. The FSB provides the Brigade Commander with a 'full time' logistician and staff for CSS advice and support. This actually increases Brigade Command Group awareness of logistical issues, constraints and capabilities.

Despite this finding, many professionals still oppose the FSB. But when they gain firsthand experience with the concept they too will then become converts to the FSB.

The DISCOM command section is organized in much the same way as in other Divisions. The Division depends greatly on a small, fully manned RACO cell at all times for rear battle planning and to assist with the handoff of the planning to a RACO unit once activated and deployed from the Reserve forces. Combining the DMMC and DISCOM Headquarters Company into one company conforms with the Army of Excellence (AOE) guidance of reducing administrative headquarters positions. However, this principle has not been observed in the AOE design of the heavy divisions. The 9th I.D. (MTZ) should be considered the target division by AOE experts, since it was tested for supportability and validated two years prior to the other combat divisions. The support battalions of the 9th I.D. (MTZ) have been organized and functioning for more than four years.

The Division Materiel Management Center is a complex organization--so much so that a diagram of its organizational structure has been included. (Figure 2) The materiel management center monitors all classes of supply except personal demand and medical items--as well as classified maps. Management responsibilities are primarily concerned with exception items--since each support battalion has a support

# DIVISION MATERIAL MANAGEMENT CENTER




FIGURE 2

operations section or a mini brigade materiel management center, both of which interface with the Brigade and DMMC. The property book sections are routinely deployed with the Brigade in both garrison and combat. This organizational structure fully supports the train-as-you-fight concept advocated in today's Army.

There are three forward support battalions (FSB) aligned with each Maneuver Brigade and its supporting slice. The FSB's each have a headquarters and supply company, intermediate level direct support maintenance company, and a medical company. Their support functions will not be fully presented but I will highlight them, noting where peculiarities exist in the methods of providing support.

The Cavalry Support Battalion is one-of-a-kind in the Army and has withstood numerous attempts at eliminating it from the force structure. It provides intermediate level aviation maintenance, direct support ground maintenance and supply support functions to the Cavalry Brigade Air Attack and its supporting units. The Aviation Support Battalion has a Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Ground Maintenance and Supply Company, and an Aircraft Maintenance Company.

The Main Support Battalion is the granddaddy of all support battalions. It provides the backup logistical support (less aviation maintenance) for the forward and aviation support battalions. Additionally, the MSB provides dedicated



support to the units deployed in the Division Rear Area (DRA). It consists of a Headquarters and Light Maintenance Company, Heavy Maintenance Company, Supply and Transportation Company, Missile Support Company and Medical Support Company.

Combining headquarters and company maintenance functions resulted in reduced administrative overhead with no decline in support. Two consolidated maintenance sections provide organizational maintenance support to the Battalion.

#### Area of Operations

Then what area of operations does the DISCOM support? Well, it is quite large. The lines of communication (LOCs) are long--requiring intensive management to insure that combat service support is provided at the critical time and place on the battlefield. The CBAA routinely performs as a fourth maneuver brigade and operates from an assembly area in the Division Rear Area until committed. The Division operates on a front of approximately 150 kilometers (km) with a depth of 200 km. (Figure 3) Each Brigade operates on an approximate 50 km front, but these distances are not fixed. Preferred engagement areas and battle positions are determined more by terrain than by frontage distances. Routinely small pockets of resistance are bypassed en route to attacking the soft underbelly of the enemy forces. That action leaves the DISCOM's corresponding soft target support units vulnerable to enemy attacks or sabotage. The austere

# AREA OF OPERATIONS




FIGURE 3

structuring of the DISCOM forward unit enhances its ability to move rapidly, hide and provide continuous support. Logistic units move over multiple routes in echelon to insure reliable support is provided throughout the operation.

The Support Battalion exercises command and control over the Brigade Support Area (BSA). It fights the rear battle against the BSA and usually has a string on a maneuver unit and the Military Police platoon to assist in the operation. The Support Battalion's early warning and weapons systems have been upgunned to provide for a more adequate defensive posture. Because of this force structure some different logistics support concepts were developed. Let's look at some of the more unique ones.

#### Commodity Support

Class I--subsistence--tray rations and meals ready to eat (MRE) are unitized at echelons above the Division. These rations are forwarded to the Brigade Support Area in 30 to 100 man preconfigured packages. Each package contains the paper ware, utensils and condiments to feed 30 or 100 soldiers respectively. Units are not required to submit ration requests; they are subject only to combat accountability. The computations for the number of rations required by each unit is based upon the automated personnel system daily strength reports. Ration requests are then adjusted by exception from the consuming unit. The Division maintains

five days of supply: three at each unit; one at each of the forward and aviation support battalions; and one at the main support battalion as backup. Rations are received and issued daily.

Class II--general supplies--are issued on a "push/pull" system. Items essential for housekeeping and administrative requirements are broken out in unit sets and pushed forward to distribution points located in each Brigade Support Area. Other items such as NBC defense clothing and common military clothing are configured in 25/50/100 man sets and requisitioned as required. Common hand tools are requested as needed by the using unit.

Class IV--barrier material--is maintained by each unit as part of a basic load--all other construction and barrier material is pushed forward by echelons above division to the project work site to minimize handling.

Major end items of equipment or weapons systems are issued through weapons systems replacement operations (WSRO). This is a relatively unpracticed and unknown system. The concept calls for the pieces of equipment to be pushed forward to the Division Support Area (DSA) where it will be placed into service and armed, if required, by the DISCOM. Qualified crews are married up from the manpower replacement pool and the entire combat ready systems are sent forward to the combat units. This system will be enhanced by adoption of the palletized loading system into our equipment inventory.

Class III--bulk petroleum--is pushed forward on a trailer exchange basis. An empty fuel pod or refueler constitutes a requisition, thereby eliminating unnecessary administrative burdens in combat. A combination of 5,000 gallon tankers, Forward Area Refueling Equipment (FARE) with 5,000 gallon inflatable containers, fuel service supply points and flexible containers with gravity or pressure feed are used to distribute fuel forward of the Brigade rear boundary. This system insures a continuous forward flow of bulk petroleum. Property managers concern for accountability inhibits this procedure, but this would not be a problem in actual combat. Additionally, fifteen days of packaged oil and lubricants are carried by each unit with an additional fifteen days stocked by the Main Support Battalion and Aviation Support Battalion.

Class V--ammunition--is probably the biggest concern of all. Maneuver units play the key role by preparing and entering input data to a stand-alone computer, which generates ammunition predictions for companies, teams, and separate platoons. These predictions are sent through the Division Ammunition Office (DAO). Requests are reviewed and command guidance such as a controlled supply rate is applied. All controlled supply rate items are automatically scheduled to be pushed forward, and exception requests are forwarded to

the supporting corps. The corps breaks out ammunition into pure company/battery level packages and pushes it forward to the supporting ammunition transfer point (ATP). The ATP is operated by a Support Battalion and includes an on-site DAO representative. Ammunition is shipped forward from Corps storage areas on Corps transportation and transferred to trucks from using units for direct delivery to the guns. External supportability tests have indicated each ATP can handle 450-700 short tons per day. The palletized loading system (PLS) or Demountable Rack Offload and Pickup System (DROPS), currently under evaluation, will greatly increase the amount of ammunition that can be handled through each servicing ATP. Recovery and evacuation capabilities will be greatly enhanced through these technological and doctrinal improvements.

Repair and maintenance is not only applicable to equipment but also to our soldiers as well and the antiquated medical support system has probably undergone the greatest face lift. The newly developed mobile modular medical support system ( $M^3S^2$ ) has been integrated into the Division. These highly mobile teams enhance task organizing, weighting the main battle area with essential medical support, and rapidly reconstituting forward medical teams that have been totally or partially destroyed. These modular plugs are identical from the front line combat units to the Corps

Support Area (CSA). Nondivisional air and ground ambulances can reduce the strain on limited medical assets by evacuating front line casualties promptly. Medical supplies are pushed forward in preconfigured packages. Two types of packages, consisting of a disease nonbattle or return-to-duty set and a trauma treatment set are pushed forward daily for the maneuver treatment squads--and every third day for the Support Battalion medical company. This system uniquely provides for these packages to be handled through the ration distribution point--one stop service. Controlled drugs/narcotics on an as-required basis, will be distributed through medical channels as they have been. This system provides a qualitative leap in medical treatment on the battlefield.

Now, let's look at the revamped direct support maintenance system. Intermediate level maintenance is provided well forward through use of dedicated maintenance support teams. Each maneuver and artillery battalion will be supported by one of these teams. Missile maintenance support for land combat systems has been enhanced forward through allocation of the improved combat support set (ICSS) in each FSB. All other missile support is provided by the missile company of the Main Support Battalion. Limited recovery capabilities are available at the direct support level in the Division; this requires establishment of Unserviceable Equipment Rally Points (UERP) at the using unit

level and Maintenance Collection Points (MCP) at the intermediate level. Unserviceable equipment is consolidated at these locations for further evacuation to the rear. Base decision guidelines for evacuation are: repairable in 1-4 hours remain in battle position and repaired on site; repairable in 4-6 hours retain at forward maintenance support team levels; if not repairable in 6 hours evacuate to Support Battalion or Maintenance Collection Point. The item must be repairable in 24-36 hours at the FSB; if not, it will be further evacuated to the Main Support Battalion in the Division Rear Area.

Class IX--repair parts--are stocked in the forward areas based on two criteria: mission essentiality and mobility. The forward support unit must be capable of uploading and hauling all of its supporting repair parts in one lift. Notwithstanding, a mandatory stockage list has been developed for each Support Battalion at a depth of thirty days. The overriding limitation is mobility. This supply system is fully automated, so only exception items are managed off line. The Main and Aviation Support Battalions will haul their mandatory stockage list items in two lifts--based on fifty percent mobility and a backup thirty day supply of common, missile and aviation repair parts. The forward stocks are replenished from the Main Support Battalion or on an item unique basis by direct throughput from echelons above the Division.



### Command and Control Enhancements

Perhaps the most important part of any support system has yet to be discussed--command and control. The 9th I.D. (MTZ) developed a unique combat multiplier in the Division Distributive Command and Control and Maneuver Control Systems. From a logistics perspective, many interfaces enhance combat command decisions and insure concentration of combat service support at the critical time and place to best influence the battle. The Division has a series of automated computer interfaces that provide near real time logistics status to the Integrated Command Posts (ICPs). This enables the commander at the proper level to have the critical data for ensuring successful accomplishment of the tactical mission. The data is pictorially displayed in the command center to provide a rapid read-out of capabilities and requirements. Combat battalions can provide the non-mission capable report in digital bursts to their dedicated Support Battalion. Likewise, a division roll-up is available at the highest level to show--as one example of the capabilities--the status of fuel to accomplish mission requirements. (Figure 4) Additionally, a review of the main supply routes (MSR's) can be called up to determine the best routes for supplying forward units. This reporting system is sophisticated to the point that if the commanding general desired, he could cause maneuver graphics and critical logistics data to be

# SIMULATED MANEUVER CONTROL SYSTEM LOGISTICS SCREEN





FIGURE 4



Commanding General could cause maneuver graphics and critical logistics data to be brought before him on his console.

brought before him on his console, in a series of screens, to provide him the decision making input to win the battle. This also provides the Command Post with rapid information for reallocating resources, task organizing, and applying command guidance. This is a broad brush of the command and control and logistics support systems for the 9th Infantry Division (Motorized). Now let's take a look at some of the system fixes still needed to refine this warfighting machine.


#### Observations and Recommendations

My recommendations should stimulate thought about this Division and force structuring in general. These fixes could vastly improve the Division's warfighting capabilities while increasing combat strengths in the foxhole--Army wide. Let me list some problems and fixes as I see them.

Recovery--we must enhance recovery assets on the battlefield through the use of flat racks off-loaded and recovered by a palletized loading system. The demountable rack off-load and pickup system (DROPS) must be rapidly integrated into the inventory as a combat multiplier. A Howitzer and its basic load of ammunition can be dropped off at the gun site of an artillery unit; at the same time a previously dropped flat rack that has been uploaded with a non-operational piece of equipment can be evacuated to the rear. This is a superb system.



A Howitzer and its basic load of ammunition can be dropped off at the gunsite of an artillery unit using PLS.



...At the same time a previously dropped flatrack that has been uploaded with a non-operational piece of equipment can be evacuated to the rear.

Medical--The brigade surgeon should be on the support battalion staff to provide the best support to the overall brigade. The support operations section of the support battalion has a validated need for a medical operator. The medical operations section of the DISCOM headquarters should be approximately seven strong and rolled up under the auspices of the DISCOM Operations Officer. This would greatly reduce the duplicated administrative requirements currently existing with a separate surgeons section. The 9th Division's surgeon section is a small functional unit fully validated. The AOE unit by comparison has a surgeons section as large as the commodity oriented medical battalion staff.

S-4/G-4 Sections--the brigade and division logistics (S-4/G-4) sections could be realigned so they function like the Division Engineer and communications electronics officer. The brigade supply functions could be rolled up under the support operations section of its dedicated Support Battalion. A few spaces could be provided to this section to accommodate internal Brigade unique supply requirements. The property book/management asset team should then be moved forward with the Support Battalion. The Division G-4 could be integrated as part of the DISCOM in the same manner. Currently in the 9th I.D. (MTZ) a logistics planner is placed with the Division G-3 section. The planners and operators

are then at the same table. A major reduction in the Materiel Management Center elephant is also in order. This should be a management by exception organization, with the thrust of routine management at the Support Battalion Support Operations Center. Through the creation of exception-only management at the DMMC, the support operations sections of the Forward could be beefed up to handle any additional requirement--while the bulk of the spaces saved could enhance the warfighting capability. This is in line with the AOE initiatives to reduce headquarters elements.

Let me bring this unique support concept and recommendations to a conclusion.

#### Conclusion

In summary, the 9th I.D. (MT2) is the epitome of a Division capable of executing AirLand Battle Doctrine. It is characterized as fast moving, highly mobile with the firepower capable of defeating a heavy division. The no-frills austere--but efficient--logistics system advantages the Division in the execution of its deep strike capability. The swirling maelstrom of this synergistic division enables it--through high technology advances--to be many places in the main battle area creating confusion and mayhem among the enemy. The Division is ready. Its readiness has been demonstrated. The 9th I.D. (MT2) soldiers are vigilantly poised and ready now to support the total Army in any contingency.





The Division is vigilantly poised and ready now to support the Army in any contingency.

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